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Comments
The Taxation of Notional Principal Contracts
After Notice 89-21: A Clear Reflection of Income
or an Abuse of the Commissioner's Discretion?
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose you are the sole shareholder of a corporation with a
large net operating loss (NOL). You have entered into negotiations
for the sale of your stock to another corporation. The buyer would
like to utilize your corporation's net operating loss to offset its in-
come, but is precluded from doing so by Section 382 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code (I.R.C.).1 In 1988, your tax advisor suggested
that your corporation enter into something called a notional princi-
pal contract. The proposed transaction would be as follows: Your
corporation and an unrelated third party would enter into a no-
tional principal contract.2 Pursuant to this notional principal con-
tract, prior to the sale your corporation would receive a large up-
front payment from the party with whom it entered the contract.
In accordance with the Internal Revenue Service's (the "Service")
long-standing position as to prepaid income,3 this entire payment
would be taxable in the year of receipt, thereby absorbing your
corporation's entire NOL. This seems like the perfect solution - or
is it? Until February of 1989, your tax advisor may have felt com-
fortable suggesting the use of one or more notional principal con-
1. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. I.R.C. § 382
prevents or limits the use by acquiring corporation of target corporation's various tax attrib-
utes, including NOLs.
2. See infra notes 6 to 22 and the accompanying text for an explanation of what no-
tional principal contracts are. A notional pricipal contract is usually entered into by contact-
ing an investment banker who acts as an intermediary and finds a third party to the
contract.
3. See infra notes 43 to 60 and the related text for a discussion of the Service's posi-
tion with respect to prepaid income.
515
Duquesne Law Review
tracts. Today, however, he might feel a little uneasy making that
suggestion. The reason for this uneasiness is that in February,
1989, the Service issued Notice 89-21 (the "Notice"),4 which con-
tained the Service's position as to the taxation of up-front lump
sum payments received pursuant to notional principal contracts. In
a nutshell, the Service's position is that Section 382 cannot be cir-
cumvented or manipulated by the use of notional principal con-
tracts.' The controversial aspect of notional principal contracts,
which is the focus of the Notice, is the timing of income. That is,
in which year or years must the recipient of the payment include
the up-front payment in income? The Notice requires the up-front
payment to be included in income over the term of the contract.
This article will first explain what notional principal contracts are
and why they are used in today's commercial environment. The
second part of this article discusses the tax treatment that similar
lump sum payments have historically been accorded by the Service
and the courts. The third part of this article explains the Service's
proposed treatment of up-front lump sum payments received pur-
suant to notional principal contracts. Finally, the fourth part of
this article critiques the Service's position and concludes that
while the Service has statutory authority for its position, it must
be careful that asserting its authority does not damage its long-
standing victories in the prepayment area.
II. WHAT IS A NOTIONAL PRINCIPAL CONTRACT?
A notional principal contract is a term used by the Service to
describe certain financial instruments such as interest rate swaps,
currency swaps, interest rate caps and similar financial arrange-
ments ("notional principal contracts").' It is appropriate to recog-
nize at the outset that notional principal contracts are not new
products developed by tax advisors. Rather, as explained below,
they serve bona fide non-tax business needs of commercial enter-
prises around the world. In particular, the uses of notional princi-
pal contracts include reducing a company's borrowing costs,
4. I.R.S. Notice 89-21, 1989-8 I.R.B. 23.
5. The Notice also impacts the use of notional principal contracts to utilize expiring
NOLs, as well as their use in characterizing income for purposes of Subpart F of the Code.
6. I.R.S. Notice 89-21, 1989-8 I.R.B. 24. The scope of the Notice is uncertain at this
time. The use of the word "certain" appears to refer to financial instruments. It is possible,
however, that the Service might attempt to apply Notice 89-21 to only certain notional prin-
cipal contracts, thereby leaving unaffected any contracts entered into for bona fide non-tax
reasons. See, however infra, note 84.
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matching fixed and variable rate assets and liabilities (referred to
as "asset and liability management"), and providing an alternative
investment for investors.7 The present abuse involving these con-
tracts is that they are being entered into solely for tax reasons, and
they are being structured to include large up-front payments which
generate income to offset expiring NOLs or to circumvent the ap-
plication of Section 382. Before one can understand the taxation of
notional principal contracts, the mechanics and purpose of each in-
strument must be understood.
A. Interest Rate Swaps
There are many types of interest rate swaps. The simplest type
of swap, which has become known as the "plain vanilla" swap, is
the type that will be used in this article to illustrate the tax issues
involved. The issues discussed herein are, however, applicable to
all of the various types of swaps.' A plain vanilla swap involves
only one currency (as contrasted with swaps involving several dif-
ferent currencies). One party exchanges its fixed-rate interest obli-
gation for the variable-rate interest obligation of the second party.
In return, the second party assumes the fixed-rate interest obliga-
tion of the first party.' The parties exchange only their interest
obligations, not the underlying obligations to repay the debts. The
underlying principal obligation is called the notional principal
amount.
The swap results in one party converting its fixed-rate obligation
into a variable-rate obligation, while the second party converts its
variable-rate obligation into a fixed-rate obligation. 10 This concept
7. See Henderson, Swap Credit Risk: A Multi-Perspective Analysis, 44 Bus. LAW.
Feb. 1989; Olander and Spell, Interest Rate Swaps: Status Under Federal Tax and Securi-
ties Laws, 45 MD. L. REV. 21 (1986).
8. Although this article will utilize the plain vanilla swap to illustrate the concepts
involved, swaps can be very complex and the variation among the different swaps is dra-
matic. See, for example, Wishon and Chevalier, Interest Rate Swaps--Your Rate or Mine,
160 J. OF ACCT. Sept. 1985 at 68, for an explanation of a "CIRCUS" (a Combined Interest
Rate and Currency Swap).
9. Id. at 64.
10. In addition to converting assets from variable rate to fixed rate or visa versa (re-
ferred to as "asset and liability management"), swaps can be used for other purposes includ-
ing, inter alia, capping the cost of variable rate debt, and obtaining cheaper debt. See Ar-
nold, How To Do Interest Rate Swaps, 62 HARV. Bus. REV., Sept. - Oct. 1984, at 96. A party
may desire that its debt be tied to a different index. Thus, an interest rate swap in this
situation would involve two parties each of whom have a variable rate obligation tied to a




is best illustrated by an example. Assume that Company X has a
$1-million variable-rate liability at the prime rate, and Company Y
has a $1-million liability on which it pays a fixed rate of 10 per-
cent. A plain vanilla swap agreement would provide that Company
X will pay Company Y $100,000 per year (10 percent of the $1-
million notional principal amount) and Company Y will pay Com-
pany X an amount computed on the prime rate. If the prime rate
for year 1 is 11 percent, Company Y will owe Company X $110,000.
Rather than each party writing a check, swap agreements usually
provide for a net payment from the party whose obligation under
the swap is greater.11
B. Interest Rate Caps, Floors and Collars
A "cap" is a vehicle that a party can use to limit its exposure
from an increase in interest rates. A cap is an agreement under
which one party (the "seller") agrees that with respect to an agreed
upon notional amount, it will make payments to another party (the
"purchaser") if the interest rate goes above an agreed upon rate.12
The parties agree that the interest rate will be determined by ref-
erence to a specified index. If during the term of the agreement the
interest rate rises above the agreed upon rate, the seller of the cap
pays the purchaser an amount equal to the amount of interest that
is attributable to the interest rate exceeding the agreed upon
11. A. KRAMER, TAXATION OF SECURITIES, COMMODITIES, AND OrIONS,§ 5A.2 at 15 (1989
Supp.). There are two ways in which payments could be made. First, the parties could ex-
change checks. In our example, Company X would give Company Y a check for $100,000
and Company Y would give Company X a check for $110,000. The second alternative is for
the parties to agree to "net payments." Under the second alternative, Company Y would
give Company X a check for $10,000, and receive nothing from Company X. If the prime
rate drops to 9% in year 2, Company X would give Company Y a check for $10,000, and
receive nothing from Company Y. It is noteworthy that a party does not have to remain in a
swap until its maturity. A swap can be terminated in one of several different ways (referred
to as "unwinding the swap"). See Grant, Why Treasurers are Swapping Swaps, EUROMONEY
April 1985 at 19. One way to terminate a swap is with the consent of the other party. Natu-
rally, this manner of unwinding a swap is possible only if both parties want out of the swap.
If so, the value of the swap agreement is usually paid to the other party. See Grant, Why
Treasurers are Swapping Swaps, EUROMONEY April 1985 at 19. A secondary market has
developed for swaps. Thus, another way to unwind a swap is through the use of a mirror
swap. A mirror swap is one which is effected by entering into another swap with a different
party on terms that effectively cancel the first swap. The first swap remains valid, but it is
negated by the second swap. Id. A mirror swap can be entered into without informing the
counter-party to the first swap.
12. Interest Rate and Currency Swaps 1989 (Practising Law Institute) at 47. The sell-
ers of caps are usually investment houses.
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rate.13 The purchaser pays the seller a fee under the agreement. 14
The fee is usually paid when the agreement is entered into or at
the beginning of the term of the cap. 5
For example, assume Company X is contemplating obtaining a
$1-million variable-rate liability at the prime rate. The company,
however, is concerned about the possibility of interest rates in-
creasing, and has determined that it would be financially impracti-
cable for it to pay the interest if rates climbed above 15 percent.
Accordingly, Company X (the purchaser) enters into an agreement
with Company Y (the seller) whereby Y agrees if the interest rate
on X's loan go above 15 percent, Y will pay X the amount of inter-
est in excess of 15 percent. Thus, 15 percent is the "interest rate
cap." In exchange for this promise, Company Y will receive a fee at
the beginning of the term of the cap from Company X.
A "floor" is the flip side of a cap. As the name implies, a floor is
an agreement under which the seller agrees to pay the purchaser if
the interest rate (determined by reference to a specified index)
falls below an agreed upon rate." As with the cap, the purchaser
pays the seller a fee at the beginning of the term of the floor. For
example, assume that in the above example Company X owns an
asset which generates income based on London interbank offered
rate (LIBOR). Company X desires some assurance that this asset
will continue to generate at least a 10 percent rate of return. To
achieve this result, Company X purchases a floor from Company
Y. Under this floor arrangement, if LIBOR drops below 10 percent,
Company Y agrees to pay Company X an amount equal to the in-
come lost as a result of LIBOR dropping below 10 percent. 7
A "collar" is a combination of a cap and a floor.' 8 It is an ar-
rangement whereby the seller agrees to pay the purchaser if the
13. Henderson, Swap Credit Risk: A Multi-Perspective Analysis, 44 Bus. LAw. Feb.
1989 at 365, n. 2.(hereinafter cited as Henderson). The seller can then limit its exposure on
the cap by specifying an upper limit on the interest rate for which it will pay the purchaser.
This device is called a vertical cap. A vertical cap may be desired not only by the seller to
reduce his risk on the cap, but also by the purchaser to reduce his cost of the cap. Id.
14. Id. A cap is very similar to an insurance policy in that the purchaser pays a fee (a
premium) to the seller for the purpose of reducing the purchaser's risk with respect to the
interest costs of certain debt. Thus, the purchaser has in effect purchased an insurance pol-
icy against the increase in interest rates.
15. Id.
16. Id. A floor is useful when a person is holding an asset that produces income based
on a variable or floating rate. Id. In such a situation, the purchaser is in effect purchasing a
guaranteed minimum rate of return on the asset.
17. See infra, note 19.
18. Henderson, supra note 13 at 365, n.2.
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interest rate falls below a certain rate (the floor) and the purchaser
agrees to pay the seller if the interest rate goes above a certain rate
(the cap). 19 For example, assume the facts of the example above. In
addition, Company Y is willing to sell a cap to Company X at an
up front price of $50,000. However, this might be more than Com-
pany X is willing to pay. Alternatively, Company Y might be will-
ing to sell this cap to Company X for $40,000 if Company X agrees
to pay Company Y if the interest rate drops below 10 percent.
Thus, Company X has protected itself against an increase in inter-
est rates at a lower initial out of pocket cost by giving up some of
the benefits (in the form of lower interest costs) of a drop in inter-
est rates. Company X has "collared" its interest costs: it will pay a
minimum of 10 percent, but no more than 15 percent. From Com-
pany Y's perspective, it has sold the cap for lower price, but it has
the potential to generate additional profits if interest rates
decline.2"
C. Currency Swaps
A currency swap is similar to an interest rate swap except that
debts denominated in different currencies (i.e., U.S. dollar and
British pound) are swapped.2' In a currency swap, one party agrees
to pay fixed periodic amounts in one currency and the other party
agrees to pay fixed periodic amounts in another currency.22 Al-
19. Id. A collar can also apply to a situation where the purchaser agrees to pay the
seller if the interest rate falls below an agreed upon rate and the seller agrees to pay the
purchaser if the rate exceeds an agreed upon rate. The interest rate that serves as a basis for
a swap, cap, floor or collar is usually based on an independent index. The most common
indices are: U.S. dollar fixed, prime, London interbank offered rate ("LIBOR"), bankers
acceptance, treasury bill, certificate of deposit, commercial paper, and zero coupon rates. Id.
at 366.
20. This example is based on Company X wanting to limit its risk of exposure on a
liability. An example of an asset driven collar would be one where Company X owned an
asset that generated income on LIBOR basis. If Company X wanted to guarantee a 10%
rate of return on this asset, it could purchase a floor from Company Y whereby Company Y
would agree to pay Company X if LIBOR fell below 10%. Alternatively, Company Y would
probably be willing to sell Company X the floor at a lower price if there was a possibility
that it could share in some of the future income generated by the asset. Thus, rather than
just purchasing a floor from Company Y, an agreement could be entered into whereby Com-
pany Y would sell the floor to Company X in exchange for a lower fee and if LIBOR rises
above 14%, Company X will pay Company Y the amount of income generated by this asset
in excess of 14%. The effect of this transaction is that Company X has guaranteed itself a
minimum rate of return of 10% and a maximum rate of return of 14%. Company Y, on the
other hand, has sold a floor for a lower up front fee than it normally would, but has secured
the potential for a substantially higher fee over the term of the agreement.
21. Interest Rate and Currency Swaps 1989 (Practising Law Institute) at 11.
22. Id.
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though currency swaps are within the scope of Notice 89-21, this'
article discusses Notice 89-21 only as it applies to other notional
principal contracts.
III. THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF LUMP SUM PAYMENTS FOR
FUTURE SERVICES
As indicated above, a notional principal contract can provide for
payments to be made periodically over the term of the agreement.
If the contract is structured in this manner, the payments will be
included in the recipient's income when they are received or re-
ceivable, depending on the recipient's method of accounting.23 Al-
ternatively, an agreement pursuant to any of the above notional
principal contracts can provide that one party will make an up-
front payment to the other party.2" It is the latter situation to
which Notice 89-21 is addressed. The year in which the party re-
ceiving the up-front payment must report the income for tax pur-
poses is the subject of this article.
For example, assume that Loss Corporation has a $200,000 NOL
that expires at the end of 1990.25 Loss has determined that it will
not be able to generate any income in 1990 to absorb the NOL.
Loss decides to enter into a notional principal contract in July,
1990. The term of the contract is five years. Assume that the total
amount to be received by Loss over the term of the contract is
$200,000. Consider the tax consequences of the two alternative
ways of structuring the payments. If payments are to be received
over the term of the contract, Loss will receive only $20,000 in
23. Under either the cash method or the accrual method of accounting, this would
probably clearly reflect the taxpayer's income. See infra, notes 29-39 and the accompanying
text. Under the cash method of accounting, the taxpayer would include each payment in
income in the year that it is actually or constructively received. Under the accrual method
of accoutning, the taxpayer would include each payment in income in the year in which the
"all events" test is met.
24. For example, in an interest rate cap contract, the purchaser (i.e., the company
which desires protection from rising interest rates) will usually pay the seller a fee up-front,
even though the cap has a term of several years. In an interest rate swap, rather than agree-
ing to net payments, the parties can agree that the party who is to make the fixed rate
payments under the terms of the swap agreement will pay the other party an up-front lump
sum payment equal to the present value of that party's obligation to make future payments
under the swap agreement. See Cantrell, Hanna, and Kurtz, Notice 89-12 Crashes the In-
terest Swap Party Tax Notes 338 (October 16, 1989). (hereinafter cited as "Cantrell").
25. Under Section 172, a corporation that incurs a NOL may carry that NOL forward
to offset its income in the next fifteen tax years. If the NOL is not used by the end of the
fifteenth taxable year, it expires and is lost forever.
1990
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1990.26 Under this alternative, if Loss' operations break even,
$20,000 of the NOL will be used in 1990, and the remaining
$180,000 will expire." If, however, the transaction is structured so
that loss receives the entire $200,000 in 1990, the historical posi-
tion taken by the Service would require the entire $200,000 to be
included in Loss' income in 1990, thereby utilizing its entire
NOL.28
A. Basic Statutory Rules
The basic statutory rules regarding reporting income are con-
tained in Sections 4469 and 451.30 Section 446(a) contains the gen-
eral rule that the taxable income of a taxpayer shall be computed
using the same method of accounting as the taxpayer uses in keep-
ing its books."' Section 446(b) contains an exception to the general
rule of Section 446(a) by providing that if the method of account-
ing used by the taxpayer does not clearly reflect income, then the
taxpayer's taxable income shall be computed using the method
which, in the Secretary of the Treasury's opinion, does clearly re-
flect income.32 The regulations under Section 446 provide that a
26. This assumes that the same amount of money will be received each year. Thus,
$40,000 is attributable to each year of the contract. Since there are only six months remain-
ing in 1990, Loss would receive only $20,000 in 1990.
27. In addition, over the remaining years of the contract, Loss would include the re-
maining $180,000 in its income. If Loss does not generate any new losses to offset this in-
come, it will pay tax on the entire $180,000.
28. For illustration purposes, this assumes that Loss would receive the entire $200,000.
However, the amount Loss would actually receive would be the present value of $200,000.
29. 26 U.S.C. 446 (1986).
30. 26 U.S.C. 451 (1986).
31. 26 U.S.C. Section 446(a) (1986) states, "Taxable income shall be computed under
the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income
in keeping his books." The regulations under Section 446 define the term "method of ac-
counting" to include "not only the over-all method of accounting but also the accounting
treatment of any item." Treas. Reg. Section 1.446-1(a)(1). See also Chesapeake Financial
Corp. v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 869, 878 (1982)(citing Sandor v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 469 (1974), aff'd,
536 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1976)). Thus, the accounting treatment on a taxpayer's books of lump
sum payments received pursuant to notional principal contracts constitutes a method of
accounting. Accordingly, under the general rule of Section 446, the taxpayer must compute
his taxable income from these payments in the same manner as such income is reported on
his books.
32. 26 U.S.C. Section 446(b) states:
If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the method
used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable income shall be made
under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income.
The regulations seem to go a little further by stating, "However, no method of accounting is
acceptable unless, in the opinion of the commissioner, it clearly reflects income." Treas. Reg.
Section 1.446-1(a)(2).
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method of accounting which clearly reflects the consistent applica-
tion of generally accepted accounting principles in a particular
trade or business will ordinarily be considered to clearly reflect in-
come. 3 Thus, from these rules one can glean the general rule that
if a taxpayer computes its taxable income using the same method
of accounting as it keeps its books, and its books are kept in con-
formity with generally accepted accounting principles, then it will
ordinarily be considered to be using a method of accounting that
clearly reflects income.
As to the year in which an item of income is to be reported, the
first part of Section 451(a) sets forth the general rule that a tax-
payer shall include any amount received in income in the year it is
received by the taxpayer. 4 The second part of Section 451(a) con-
tains an exception to this general rule by providing that if under
the taxpayer's method of accounting an amount properly belongs
to a period other than the one in which it is received, then it is
included in the taxpayer's income in such other period.3 5
The regulations under Section 446 specifically address two per-
missible methods of accounting: the cash receipts and disburse-
ments method and the accrual method. Under the cash method
of accounting, an item is includible in income in the year that it is
actually or constructively received." Thus, if a taxpayer using the
cash method of accounting receives a lump-sum payment that is
attributable to services to be performed in future years, based on
this regulation, the payment would ordinarily be included in the
taxpayer's income in the year in which it is received by the
taxpayer.
Under the accrual method of accounting, an item is includible in
33. See Treas. Reg. Section 1.446-1(a)(2), which states (in part):
A method of accounting which reflects the consistent application of generally ac-
cepted accounting principles in a particular trade or business in accordance with ac-
cepted conditions or practices in that trade or business will ordinarily be regarded as
clearly reflecting income, provided all items of gross income and expense are treated
consistently from year to year.
34. Section 451(a) states:
The amount of any item of gross income shall be included in the gross income for the
taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless under the method of account-
ing used in computing taxable income, such amount is to be properly accounted for as
a different period.
35. Id.
36. See Treas. Reg. Section 1.446-1(c). The use of the cash method is permitted (sub-
ject to several exceptions) even though it is not ordinarily permitted under generally ac-
cepted accounting principles.
37. Treas. Reg. Sections 1.451-1(a) and 1.446-1(c)(i).
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income in the tax year "when all the events have occurred which
fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be
determined with reasonable accuracy." 8 Thus, in a situation where
the taxpayer receives a payment for future services and he will not
be required to return the payment, the entire payment is taxable
in the year of receipt.39
It is noteworthy that reporting the entire payment as income in
the year of receipt is contrary to generally accepted accounting
principles. Under generally accepted accounting principles, the
payment would be taken into income over the term of the agree-
ment for which the payment was received. This disparity between
tax accounting and financial accounting is a product of the differ-
ent objective that each of these methods attempts to achieve.'0 Fi-
nancial accounting attempts to match income and expenses by rec-
ognizing income in the same period in which the expenses which
produced that income occurred, thereby providing users with infor-
mation for management or investment decisions.'1 This is consis-
tent with the general accounting principle of conservatism.
The primary objective of tax accounting, on the other hand, is
not with conservatism or matching income and expenses. Rather,
its purpose is to raise revenue, and accordingly is based on the tax-
payer's ability to pay the tax on the item received.' 2 This basis is
reflected not only in permitting the cash method of accounting, but
also in the all events test for accrual method of accounting under
the regulations. Thus, for tax accounting purposes, a prepayment
for services will generally be entirely taxable in the year of receipt,
whereas, for financial accounting purposes, it will be included in
income over the period when the services are performed.
38. Treas. Reg. Sections 1.446-1(c)(ii) and 1.451-1(a).
39. See Automobile Club of Mich. v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); American Auto.
Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Schlude v. Comm'r, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); RCA
Corp. v. United States, 664 F.2d 881 (2nd Cir. 1981); T.F H. Publications, Inc. v. Comm'r,
72 T.C. 623 (1979) and the cases cited therein. Cf. Artnell Co. v. Comm'r, 400 F.2d 981 (7th
Cir. 1968).
40. See Silk, Advance Payments - Prepaid Income: Recent Developments; An Old
Problem Put to Rest, 30 N.Y.U.INST. FED. TAX'N. 1651, 1652 (1972).
41. As the Supreme Court stated in Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 522,
542:
The primary goal of financial accounting is to provide useful information to manage-
ment, shareholders, creditors, and others properly interested; the major responsibility
of the accountant is to protect these parties from being misled. The primary goal of
the income tax system, in contrast, is the equitable collection of revenue; the major
responsibility of the Internal Revenue Service is to protect the public fisc.
42. See Silk, supra note 40 at 1653. See also, RCA Corp. v. United States, 664 F.2d
881, 887 (2nd Cir. 1981).
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B. The Courts' Treatment of Prepaid Income
Beginning in 1957, the Supreme Court settled the issue of the
Commissioner's discretion as to the taxation of prepayments for
services when it decided the famous trilogy of Automobile Club of
Mich. v. Comm'r, " American Auto. Ass'n. v. United States,"4 and
Schlude v. Comm'r.," In each of these cases the Supreme Court
agreed with the Commissioner's determination that the taxpayer's
method of reporting the prepaid fees over the term of the agree-
ment did not clearly reflect income. The taxpayers used the ac-
crual method of accounting, under which they recognized the in-
come from the prepayments over the terms of their agreements.
In Michigan, supra, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether membership dues received by an automobile club were in-
come when they were received or when they are earned. The tax-
payer received dues in advance for services to be performed during
the next year." The 'taxpayer took one-twelfth of the dues into in-
come each month of the year for which the dues were paid. The
taxpayer consistently used this method of accounting.
The Commissioner determined that the taxpayer had received
these prepaid dues under a claim of right and without restriction
as to their use. As such, under the holding of North American Oil
Consolidated v. Burnet,4 7 the entire amount of dues received
should be reported by the taxpayer in income in the year in which
they are received. The Court noted that the pro-rata allocation of
the prepaid dues was artificial and it bore no relation to the ser-
vices to be rendered by the taxpayer.4" Accordingly, the Court held
that the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in taxing the
prepayments in the year they were received."
In 1961, the Supreme Court decided AAA, supra. The factual
situation in AAA was identical to Michigan. The taxpayer in AAA
argued that Michigan was distinguishable because AAA's method
43. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
44. 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
45. 372 U.S. 128 (1963).
46. Michigan, 353 U.S. at 188. The dues were deposited in the taxpayer's general
banking account and were available, and were actually used, for general corporate purposes.
Id. When the dues were received, the taxpayer recorded them on its books as a liability
(unearned dues). As each month passed, a ratable portion of these dues were recorded as
income, with a corresponding reduction in the taxpayer's liability. Id.
47. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
48. Michigan, 353 U.S. at 189.
49. Id. at 189-90.
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of accounting was based on and supported by past experience."
Nonetheless, the Court held that the Commissioner had not
abused his discretion in requiring taxation in the year of receipt.
5 1
The Court, in AAA, based its holding on Congressional action,
rather than on its decision in Michigan.2 The Court reasoned that
when Congress retroactively repealed Sections 452 and 462, which
would have permitted the taxpayer's method of accounting, it ef-
fectively forbid the taxpayer's method of accounting for tax pur-
poses.51 In addition, Section 455, which permits the deferral of in-
come in certain industries, was added to the Code after the Court's
decision in Michigan.
5 4
The last of the trilogy was Schlude, which involved a taxpayer
who received advance payments for dancing lessons to be given at
future unspecified times. Like Michigan and AAA, the prepay-
ments were non-refundable and the dance lessons were not to be
rendered on definite dates. Rather, the times of the lessons were
determined by the student and the instructor. The Court stated
that the case was controlled by AAA. 5 The Court in Schlude held
that the taxpayer's method of accounting had the same defect as
the method used by the taxpayers in Michigan and AAA; the pay-
ments were received for services which were to be performed essen-
tially upon the "customers' demands without relation to fixed
dates in the future. ' ' 56 Accordingly, the Commissioner did not
abuse his discretion in requiring the prepayments to be recognized
50. AAA, 367 U.S. at 691.
51. Id. The Court addressed the relevance of generally accepted accounting principles
by stating that although the taxpayer's method of accounting was in accord with generally
accepted accounting principles, "It is not to hold that for income tax purposes it [the use of
generally accepted accounting principles] so clearly reflects income as to be binding on the
Treasury." Id. at 693 (footnote omitted).
52. In both Michigan and AAA, the Court distinguished Beacon Publishing Co. v.
Comm'r, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955) and Schuessler v. Comm'r, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir.
1956), both of which permitted deferral of prepaid income.
53. 367 U.S. at 694-95.
54. Id. at 696. Section 455 permits the deferral of income from prepaid subscriptions
of newspapers, magazines and periodicals. The Court in AAA noted that "An effort was
made in the Senate to add a provision in Section 455 which would extend its coverage to
prepaid automobile club membership dues. However, in conference the House Conferees
refused to accept this amendment." Id.
55. Schlude, 372 U.S. at 134.
56. Id. at 135. The Court stated:
Relying upon Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner . . . the Court [in
AAA] rejected the taxpayer's system as artificial since the advance payments related
to services which were to be performed only upon customers' demands without rela-
tion to fixed dates in the future. The system employed here suffers from the very
same vice, for the studio sought to defer its cash receipts on the basis of contracts
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in the year of receipt.
The cases decided subsequent to Schlude have generally re-
quired immediate taxation of prepayments for services based on
the Commissioner's discretion under Section 446(b). The focus of
these cases has been on whether the dates of future services were
fixed. For example, in RCA Corp. v. United States 57 , the Second
Circuit held that the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in
requiring the payments received for service contracts to be in-
cluded in the taxpayer's income in the year of receipt, rather than
over the terms of the contracts, which ranged from three to
twenty-four months. The Court held that these service contracts,
like the contracts in Michigan, AAA and Schlude, obligated the
taxpayer to perform upon the customers' demands, rather than at
fixed times in the future. 8 At the inception of the contract, the
taxpayer could not be certain as to the time and number of per-
formances required, and accordingly could not be certain of the
income it would earn and when it would be earned.59 Thus, the
Commissioner did not abuse his discretion."0
The Service has not been successful in all its attempts to tax
prepayments in the year of receipt. In Artnell Co. v. Comm'r61, the
Seventh Circuit permitted the taxpayer to defer the recognition of
prepayments for services. The taxpayer purchased all the stock of
the Chicago White Sox, Inc., which operated the Chicago White
Sox baseball team. Shortly thereafter the taxpayer liquidated
White Sox, Inc. and continued to operate the team. At the time of
the liquidation, the White Sox had received prepayments as a re-
sult of advance sales of tickets.2 Under the taxpayer's method of
which did not provide for lessons on fixed dates after the taxable year.
Id.
57. 664 F.2d 881 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982), See also, Stan-
dard Television Tube Corp. v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 238 (1975).
58. 664 F.2d at 888.
59. Id. The Court further stated that "The Commissioner was not required to subject
the federal revenues to the vicissitudes of RCA customers' future demands for services." Id.
60. Id. at 889. The District Court found that the taxpayer's method of accounting
clearly reflected income. However, the Court of Appeals stated that the issue was not
whether the taxpayer's method of accounting "adequately reflected income." Rather, the
issue is whether the Commissioner abused his discretion. Id. at 889. The standard used by
the Court to determine whether the Commissioner abused his discretion was that "[it] must
be upheld unless it is clearly unlawful." Id. at 886.
61. 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968).
62. Id. The prepayments included the proceeds of advance sales of season tickets, sin-
gle admissions to games, revenues for broadcasting and televising games, and season parking
books. Id. at 982. The liquidation of White Sox, Inc. resulted in a short tax year that ended
on May 31, 1962. The Commissioner argued that the money received from advance sales as
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accounting, the amount of income allocable to each game would be
taken into income at the time the game was played. The Commis-
sioner argued that the proceeds from advance sales were taxable
when received.
The Tax Court held that the proceeds were taxable in the year
of receipt, regardless of the taxpayer's method of accounting."' The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit remanded the case back
to the Tax Court to determine whether the taxpayer's method of
accounting clearly reflected income. The Seventh Circuit stated
that there are some deferral techniques that so clearly reflect in-
come that the Commissioner would abuse his discretion if he disal-
lowed it.64 The Court distinguished Michigan, AAA and Schlude
based on the uncertainty of the timing of the future events in
those cases, which was not present in Artnell.
5
The Tax Court has since stated that it will not follow Artnell
unless, "the facts present a certainty, of performance or fixed
dates, such as was presented in Artnell Co."'6 6 However, on at least
one occasion the Tax Court has followed Artnell.67 But in this case,
Artnell was followed because of the Golsen rule. 8
of May 31 was taxable to White Sox, Inc. in the short tax year ended May 31. Id.
63. Artnell Co. v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 411 (1967), rev'd 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968).
64. 400 F.2d at 985. The Court of Appeals perceived the Tax Court's position to be
that the Commissioner has "complete and unreviewable discretion to reject deferral of pre-
paid income where Congress has made no provision." Id. at 984. The Seventh Circuit's re-
sponse to the Tax Court's position was:
It is our best judgment that, although the policy of deferring, where possible, to con-
gressional procedures in the tax field will cause the Supreme Court to accord the
widest possible latitude to the commissioner's discretion, there must be situations
where the deferral technique will so clearly reflect income that the Court will find an
abuse of discretion if the commissioner rejects it.
Id. at 984-85. On remand, the Tax Court held that the taxpayer's method ofaccounting was
more supportable than the method asserted by the Commissioner. Thus, the taxpayer's
method of accounting for advance sales was sustained. See Artnell v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M.
403 (1970).
65. 400 F.2d at 983-85. The Court stated: "The uncertainty stressed in those decisions
is not present here. The deferred income was allocable to games which were to be played on
a fixed schedule. Except for rain dates, there was certainty. We would have no difficulty
distinguishing the instant case in this respect." Id. at 984.
66. T.F.H. Publications, Inc. v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 623, 644 (1979) (citing Standard Tel-
evision Tube Corp v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 238, 242 (1975) aff'd, 622 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1980)).
See also, Allied Fidelity Corp. v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 1068, 1077 (1976), aff'd, 572 F.2d 1190
(7th Cir. 1978).
67. See, Collegiate Cap & Gown Co. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1978-226.
68. Golsen v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
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IV. NOTICE 89-21
In Notice 89-21, the Service took a surprising and, in light of the
above discussion, a seemingly contradictory position. The Service
took the position that up-front lump sum payments, received pur-
suant to notional principal contracts, are not taxable in the year of
receipt. Rather, they are to be taken into income over the term of
the agreement." The Service asserts that including the entire pay-
ment in income in the year of receipt does not clearly reflect the
taxpayer's income. In order to clearly reflect income, the Commis-
sioner, pursuant to I.R.C. Section 446(b), will require the payment
to be taken into income over the term of the contract.
Although this appears to be a pro-taxpayer position, the purpose
of Notice 89-21 is to prevent certain perceived abuses that can oc-
cur when the normal rules for the taxation of prepayments (i.e.:
Michigan, AAA and Schlude) are used. The abuse occurs princi-
pally in three situations. First, Notice 89-21 is intended to prevent
corporations from offsetting NOLs shortly before the corporation
is about to be acquired. The second perceived abuse occurs when a
corporation enters into a notional principal contract to utilize ex-
piring NOLs.70 The third scenario pertains to the characterization
and timing of income for purposes of Subpart F of the Code.71
The first situation occurs when a corporation (the "acquiring
corporation") wishes to purchase another corporation (the "target
corporation"). When the target corporation has a very large net
operating loss carryover from prior years. I.R.C. Section 382 se-
verely limits the amount of the target corporation's NOL that the
acquiring corporation can use to offset its income in future years. 2
To circumvent the limitations imposed by Section 382, the target
corporation would enter into an interest rate swap contract with an
investment banker. 73 The terms of the swap would include an up-
front lump sum payment to the target corporation, rather than
netting payments over the term of the contract.74
69. I.R.S. Notice 89-21, 1989-8 I.R.B. 24.
70. For an example, see supra, notes 25 to 28 and the accompanying text.
71. Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code contains the rules dealing with income
earned from sources outside the United States. Although Notice 89-21 impacts these rules,
they are beyond the scope of this article.
72. 26 U.S.C. Section 382 (1986) limits the use of target corporation's NOL when there
has been a change in ownership of target. For an explanation of Section 382, see Barr, Net
Operating Losses-Sections 381, 382 & 269, 27-5th TAX MGMT. (BNA).
73. Alternatively, target could enter into an interest rate cap contract or one of the
other types of notional principal contracts. See supra, notes 12 to 22.
74. See supra, note 11 for a discussion of the netting process. The amount of the up-
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Under Michigan, AAA and Schlude, which also represented the
Service's position until Notice 89-21 was issued, the target corpora-
tion would include the entire up-front payments in income in the
year of receipt, thereby using its entire NOL. Some time after the
interest rate swap, acquiring corporation will purchase the target
corporation. Under the terms on the swap contract, the target cor-
poration will make periodic payments to the bank over the term of
the contract. Thus, acquiring corporation will indirectly receive the
benefit of the target corporation's NOL because the acquiring cor-
poration will receive the benefit of the target's deductions for in-
terest payments made after the target is purchased.
Although this article discusses only the clear reflection of income
aspect of Notice 89-21, it is important to keep in mind that the
Notice expressly limits its scope by excluding from its application
any transactions that are "not properly characterized as notional
principal contracts."7 Thus, if the up-front payment is character-
ized as a loan or an insurance premium, Notice 89-21 will not ap-
ply. Rather, the payment will be treated as any other item prop-
erly characterized as a loan or insurance premium.76
V. THE SERVICE'S TIGHTROPE
No doubt, the Service will attempt to distinguish Michigan,
AAA and Schlude on the same basis that Artnell distinguished
these cases: the timing of performance in the Michigan trilogy was
not fixed whereas under the swap contract, the dates for payment
are fixed. 77 Thus, the Service will argue that Artnell should be fol-
lowed in notional principal contract cases, thereby attempting to
turn its defeat in Artnell to its advantage.
front payment to the target corporation will be the present value of the investment bank's
obligation to make future payments under the swap contract. The terms of the swap will be
that the target corporation is swapping its fixed debt for the investment bank's variable
debt. Thus, the amount and timing of the bank's future payments are known and their
present value can be calculated. See Cantrell, supra note 24 at 338 (citing F. Martin
Belmore, Interest Rates & Currency Swaps 1988, (Practising Law Institute) at 135 and 151.
75. I.R.S. Notice 89-21. More specifically, the Notice states:
No inference should be drawn from this notice as to the proper treatment of transac-
tions that are not properly characterized as notional principal contracts, for instance,
to the extent that such transactions are in substance properly characterized as loans.
In addition, no inference should be drawn from this notice as to the characterization
of a contract as an insurance contract or annuity contract or the proper treatment of
payments made under insurance or annuity contracts.
76. For an analysis of the loan or insurance premium characterization, see Cantrell
supra.
77. See, Artnell, supra notes 61 to 65 and the accompanying text.
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The Service must be careful, however, as to how strenuously it
attempts to distinguish the trilogy and follow Artnell. The Service
is walking a tightrope. It wishes to defer the taxation of up-front
payments when notional principal contracts are involved. But
when any other type of prepayment is involved, the Service wants
the taxpayer to recognize income immediately. 8 If the Service does
not aggressively distinguish the trilogy, it will not overcome the
precedent which almost seems to be cast in stone. But, if the Ser-
vice successfully distinguishes the trilogy, and the Supreme Court
agrees, this could breathe new life into Artnell. Certainly it would
be a new basis upon which taxpayers could attempt to assail the
Michigan trilogy, thereby deferring income and tax revenues.
Thus, the Service could win the battle over notional principal con-
tracts, but blow a "gaping hole" in its defense against the war on
prepayments, which until Notice 89-21, it seemed to have won.
In Notice 89-21, the Service expressly relies on Section 446(b) of
the I.R.C. as its authority for its position. Although the cases re-
peatedly refer to the Commissioner's broad discretion under Sec-
tion 446(b),79 it must be kept in mind that the Service relied on
Section 446(b) in Michigan, AAA and Schlude to reach a contrary
result in very similar situations.
Taxpayers will argue that the cases in the Michigan trilogy are
controlling. In this regard, the Service's position may be difficult to
sustain, at least outside the Seventh Circuit and the Claims Court.
It is relevant to keep in mind that the Tax Court has expressly
stated that it will not follow the reasoning in Artnell.80 Thus, the
taxpayer will opt to resolve any notional principal contract dis-
puted in Tax Court where at least the Court has indicated its disa-
greement with Artnell.
Despite the Tax Court's disapproval of ArtneU1, taxpayers should
not feel too comfortable in Tax Court. After all, the Tax Court has
repeatedly upheld the Commissioner's broad discretion.8 1 In addi-
78. As indicated in Note 6, supra, the scope of Notice 89-21 is uncertain at this time.
It is possible that the Service could take the very aggressive position that the Notice applies
only to notional principal contracts that are tax-motivated. Under this approach, the Ser-
vice would attempt to defer recognition of income on "abusive notional principal contracts",
but retain the general rule of Schlude when taxing notional principal contracts entered into
for bona fide non-tax business reasons.
79. See Continental Illinois Corp. v. Comm'r, - T.C.M. (CCH) 790 (1989); Molsen
v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 485, 498 (1985); Applied Communications, Inc. v. Comm'r, - T.C.M.
(CCH) - (1989). See also infra note 82.
80. See supra, note 66 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 79.
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tion, the Supreme Court on several occasions has recognized the
Commissioner's broad discretion under Section 446(b).
82
VI. CONCLUSION
The Service's controversial position in Notice 89-21 would
clearly be within its discretion under Section 446(b) if Michigan,
AAA and Schlude were not on the books. These cases cast some
uncertainty on the Service's position because it is a complete re-
versal of its long-standing position on prepayments. As indicated
above,8 3 the Service could apply Notice 89-21 to all notional princi-
pal contracts or only to certain "abusive" notional principal con-
tracts (i.e: ones which were entered into solely for tax reasons)."'
Under either approach, the Service's authority under Section
446(b) will be tested. Certainly, the final determination of Notice
89-21 in the courts will indicate whether the Service has, as has
been suggested, "complete and unreviewable discretion" 5 or
whether Artnell'is the anomaly it appears to be.
Albert J. Vernacchio
82. In addition to upholding the Commissioner's determinations in the trilogy, the Su-
preme Court has expressly recognized the broad discretion granted to the Commissioner
under Sectionn 446(b). See Thor Power Tool, supra note 41; United States v. Catto, 384
U.S. 102 (1966) ("Congress has granted the Commissioner broad discretion in shepherding
the accounting methods used by taxpayers." Id. at 114). See also Comm'r v. Hansen, 360
U.S. 446 (1959).
83. See supra note 6.
84. The Service has implicitly indicated that it will apply Notice 89-21 to all notional
principal contracts. See P.L.R. 8938068, 1989 P.L.R. LEXIS 2029 (June 29, 1989) (Service
applied Notice 89-21 and held that a bank must take income from the up-front lump-sum
payment into income over the term of the contract).
85. Artnell, 400 F.2d at 984. See supra, note 64.
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